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Abstract 
Early modern experimental philosophers often appear to commit to, and utilise, 
corpuscular and mechanical hypotheses. This is somewhat mysterious: such hypotheses 
frequently appear to be simply assumed, odd for a research program which emphasises 
the careful experimental accumulation of facts. Isaac Newton was one such experimental 
philosopher, and his optical work is considered a clear example of the experimental 
method. Focusing on his optical investigations, I identify three roles for hypotheses. 
Firstly, Newton introduces a hypothesis to explicate his abstract theory. The purpose 
here is primarily to improve understanding or uptake of the theory. Secondly, he uses a 
hypothesis as a platform from which to generate some crucial experiments to decide 
between competing accounts. The purpose here is to suggest experiments in order to 
bring a dispute to empirical resolution. Thirdly, he uses a hypothesis to suggest an 
underlying physical cause, which he then operationalises and represents abstractly in his 
formal theory. The second and third roles are related in that they are both cases of 
scaffolding: hypotheses provide a temporary platform from which further experimental 
work and/or theorising can be carried out. In short, the entities and processes included 
in Newton’s optical hypothesis are not simply assumed hypothetical posits. Rather, they 
play instrumental roles in Newton’s experimental philosophy. 
 
1 Introduction 
Isaac Newton was often explicitly anti-hypotheses. He expressed this attitude in various 
methodological statements such as this one from Query 31 of the Opticks: 
This Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general 
Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but 
such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths. For Hypotheses are not to be 
regarded in experimental Philosophy (Newton, 1952: 404). 
Forthcoming in Vanzo, A and Anstey, P (eds.), Experiment, 
Speculation and Religion in Early Modern Philosophy, Routledge. 
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And this one from the General Scholium to the Principia: 
I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for these properties of gravity, 
and I do not feign hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a 
hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or 
mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy (Newton, 1999: 943). 
Prima facie, Newton’s speculations concerning the nature of light belie these anti-
hypothetical statements. In his 1675 paper ‘An Hypothesis explaining the Properties of 
Light discoursed of in my severall Papers’, for instance, Newton described light as a 
collection of tiny particles, or corpuscles, that are emitted from shining, or ‘luminiferous’, 
bodies. A similar hypothesis is described in the Opticks in Books 2 and 3. It might seem 
surprising, considering his railing against hypotheses, that a corpuscular hypothesis is 
introduced so prominently in Newton’s optical work. One might even wonder if, against 
his own methodological decree, Newton is feigning the corpuscular hypothesis. 
In fact, Newton’s position on hypotheses is much more interesting and complicated 
than the above passages suggest. While hypotheses are certainly not the goal of 
investigation—they are not an end in themselves—they nonetheless play vital supporting 
roles in Newton’s experimental philosophy. In his early optical papers, Newton describes 
two permissible roles for hypotheses: (1) to explicate abstract theories with concrete 
metaphysics, thus providing a ‘possibility proof’ for the theory; and (2) to suggest 
experiments, thus offering new avenues for empirical support. 
Examining the ways in which Newton employs hypotheses in his optical 
investigations, I discuss Newton’s two permissible roles for hypotheses and identify a 
third. Firstly, Newton introduces his hypothesis on the nature of light to illustrate or 
explicate his abstract account of the composition of white light. The purpose here is 
primarily to improve uptake or understanding of the abstract theory. This fits with 
Newton’s (1) above. Secondly, Newton uses Hooke’s hypotheses on light as a platform 
from which to generate some crucial experiments to decide between his account and 
Hooke’s. The purpose here is to suggest experiments in order to bring the dispute to an 
empirical resolution. This fits with Newton’s (2) above. Thirdly, Newton uses his 
hypothesis on the nature of light in his investigations of interference phenomena. Here, 
the hypothesis suggests an underlying physical cause that Newton operationalises and 
thus represents abstractly in his formal theory of fits. This third use of a hypothesis does 
not fit with either of the roles Newton explicitly identifies, and yet it fits his overarching 
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methodology. Moreover, the second and third roles are related in that they are both cases 
of scaffolding. In both cases, hypotheses provide a temporary platform from which further 
experimental work and/or theorising can be carried out. 
The term ‘scaffolding’ here is an architectural metaphor. In architecture, scaffolding 
provides either temporary support for a building during construction or maintenance, or 
a temporary platform for workers and/or materials during the construction or 
maintenance of a building. Scaffolding is not part of the building; it is supposed to be 
removed after it has served its function. The analogue in Newton’s methodology is his 
insistence that hypotheses be extracted from the final formal theory. Characterising 
Newton’s method of hypotheses as scaffolding allows us to explain how Newton can, on 
the one hand, insist that he is not ‘feigning’ hypotheses, but on the other put them to 
work. Newton might make use of hypotheses in developing his theory, but the 
hypothesis is nonetheless separate from that theory—and not an essential part of it.1  
Obviously, in the building context, things can go wrong. Sometimes a building is never 
completed, and so the scaffolding becomes a permanent fixture (consider, for example, 
Gaudi’s unfinished cathedral, Sagrada Família). Sometimes the scaffolding cannot be 
removed and becomes part of the design (consider, for example, the 13th-century 
scaffolding of the spire of Salisbury Cathedral that is now a tourist attraction). Such 
failures, too, have analogues in Newton’s work. For example, we might regard the Opticks 
Book 3 as an uncompleted investigation: the queries represent hypotheses that are 
supposed to scaffold Newton’s theorising. (We shall discuss such cases in section 3.2.) 
Philosophers of science use the concept of scaffolding in a number of ways. For 
example, Adrian Currie applies the notion to the generation of scientific knowledge (e.g. 
Currie, 2015, 2018).2  Currie argues that scaffolding occurs when a general or coarse-
grained hypothesis that is relatively well-supported provides a platform from which to 
distinguish empirically between two or more finer-grained hypotheses. This account has 
much in common with the way Newton utilised Robert Hooke’s hypothesis to suggest 
experiments. (We shall discuss this point in section 2.2.)  However, the kind of 
                                                 
1 Indeed, the construction of King’s College Chapel in Cambridge required an enormous amount of 
scaffolding that was not part of the finished product—as evidenced by the presence of numerous ‘putlog 
holes’ which show us where the scaffolding had been (Fitchen, 1981: 248). 
2 Also, a recent volume applies the notion to human cognition and evolution (Caporael, et al., 2014). 
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scaffolding we find in Newton’s investigation of interference phenomena looks very 
different to this—as evidenced by the fact that Alan Shapiro has characterised this 
investigation as “very much as in the hypothetico-deductive method” (Shapiro, 1993: 
200). It is misleading to characterise Newton’s methodology in this way—there is little in 
his explicit methodological statements to support it (Walsh, 2017). But it is worth 
considering how my interpretation and Shapiro’s differ. Shapiro regards the trajectory 
from hypothesis to formal theory in Newton’s work as a process of deducing empirical 
consequences from the hypothesis and using experimental results to make adjustments to 
the hypothesis. Over the course of the investigation, the hypothesis is refined until it fits 
with all the observations. In contrast, I regard the process as one of abstraction. In 
scaffolding-language, Newton’s hypothesis provides a temporary platform to enable him 
to get empirical traction on a vague hypothetical concept. Once that traction is obtained, 
Newton sets about removing the scaffolding. Shapiro’s account suggests a higher level of 
commitment to hypothetical posits and processes than I think is warranted. 
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 2, I offer an account of Newton’s 
explicit method of hypotheses: first, I outline Newton’s distinction between theories and 
hypotheses, then I discuss the two roles for hypotheses identified in Newton’s 
methodological statements. In section 3, I discuss Newton’s investigation of interference 
phenomena—the appearance of coloured rings on thin films. I outline the process by 
which Newton moved from the initial observations to the final theory of fits, focusing 
on the transition from ‘æthereal pulses’ to ‘intervals of fits’. I then characterise this 
process as scaffolding. In section 4, I conclude by considering two upshots of 
scaffolding. The first concerns how we should understand Newton’s metaphysics. I argue 
that we should understand Newton’s metaphysical posits functionally: to be a corpuscle, 
on Newton’s account, is to play a certain kind of role. The second upshot concerns what 
the case teaches us about the relationship between corpuscularism and early modern 
experimental philosophy. Early modern experimental philosophers often appear to 
commit to, and utilise, corpuscular and mechanical hypotheses. In this respect, Newton’s 
attitude to corpuscles looks idiosyncratic—he neither assumed nor argued for them. 
Rather, corpuscles were hypotheses and thus played an instrumental role in his 
experimental philosophy. 
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2 Newton’s method of hypotheses 
Before we consider Newton’s optical work in detail, it will be helpful to understand 
Newton’s methodological statements concerning hypotheses such as the ones we saw in 
the introduction. So in this section, I outline Newton’s distinction between theories and 
hypotheses and sketch the roles played by hypotheses in Newton’s experimental 
philosophy. 
2.1 The theory–hypothesis distinction 
A well-known feature of Newton’s methodology is his distinction between certainty and 
uncertainty.3  Newton contrasted the certainty of his own natural philosophical claims 
with the mere hypotheses and speculations which other philosophers found appealing. 
Consider, for example, the following methodological statement from Newton’s letter to 
the Royal Society, detailing his new optical theory:4 
A naturalist would scearce expect to see the science of [colours] become mathematicall, & yet I dare 
affirm that there is as much certainty in it as in any other part of Opticks. For what I shall tell 
concerning them is not an hypothesis but most rigid consequence, not conjectured by barely 
inferring ‘tis thus because not otherwise or because it satisfies all Phænomena (the Philosophers 
universall Topick,) but evinced by the mediation of experiments concluding directly & without any 
suspicion of doubt (6 February 1672, Newton, 1959-1977: 96-97). 
Here, Newton exhibits a striking lack of epistemic modesty. At a time when the Royal 
Society valued epistemic humility, never claiming certainty when the evidence only 
supported high probability,5 Newton asserted certainty—and apparently without any 
special warrant! 
In fact, Newton thought he was warranted in making such claims, because he had a 
reliable methodology. His approach was based on the idea that mathematics is a bearer 
of certainty—if one begins with certain axioms, one can reason deductively to certain 
                                                 
3 This distinction has been discussed by (e.g. Guicciardini, 2011, Shapiro, 1993, Walsh, 2012b). 
4 This passage was omitted when the letter was published in the Philosophical Transactions (Newton, 
1672). 
5 See, for example, Robert Hooke’s ‘Preface to the Royal Society’ in his Micrographia (Hooke, 
1966/1665). 
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theorems without epistemic loss. Newton thought it was possible to apply this method of 
reasoning to natural philosophy: one can reason deductively from laws and principles to 
propositions in natural philosophy. So, if one can establish certain natural philosophical 
principles, it is possible to reason mathematically to certain propositions. By reasoning in 
this way, Newton thought he could achieve a mathematical science. The challenge, then, 
was to identify principles that meet this requirement of certainty—via deduction from 
phenomena.6 
Newton’s distinction between certainty and uncertainty is best characterised as a 
distinction between ‘theories’ and ‘hypotheses’ (outlined in table 1).7  In Newton’s 
methodology, theories and hypotheses deal with different subject matter, have different 
epistemic statuses and, as we shall see, perform different roles in the explanation of 
natural phenomena. Theories systematise the observable, measurable properties of 
things; hypotheses describe the (unobservable) nature of things. Theories are inferred 
from observation and experiment; hypotheses are speculative. For example, Newton 
regarded the heterogeneity of white light as a theory, since it was inferred from the 
observed phenomenon of the elongated prismatic spectrum (codified by the experimentum 
crucis), had empirically testable consequences and was used to systematise those 
observations. However, an explanation involving the nature of light—e.g. an emission or 
corpuscularian account—would be a hypothesis, since it concerned the unobservable 
nature of things, and was speculative, rather than inferred from experiment—and thus, 
any explanation of this sort would be, at best, only probable. 
The distinction between theories and hypotheses is central to Newton’s 
methodology. For Newton, theories were on epistemically surer footing than hypotheses 
because they were grounded on phenomena, whereas hypotheses were grounded in 
speculations. And so, hypotheses could not undermine theories. When faced with a 
                                                 
6 For Isaac Barrow’s early influence on this methodology, see (Dear, 1995: chapter 8, Dunlop, 2012). 
7 Newton introduced his theory-hypothesis distinction in his response to Robert Hooke (11 June 
1672). Here he explicitly used the labels ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’ to draw the epistemic distinction I have 
just outlined and which was implicit in his earlier writing (Newton, 1959-1977: 173-174). Newton rarely 
used the term ‘theory’ in his publications. What remains consistent is the epistemic distinction, rather than 
the labels themselves. My definition of ‘theory’ corresponds to his use of the labels ‘proposition’, ‘theorem’ 
and, in the context of his early optical work, to the term ‘doctrine’. For a discussion of the distinction 
between theories and hypotheses in early modern philosophy more generally, see (Ducheyne, 2013). 
 7 
disagreement between a hypothesis and a theory (e.g. suppose that our theory states that 
white light is a compound, but the most plausible hypothesis about the nature of light 
states that white light is pure and homogeneous), we should modify the hypothesis to fit 
the theory, and not vice versa. 
Theory Hypothesis 
A proposition is a ‘theory’ iff it meets the following 
conditions: 
T1. It is certainly true, because it is reliably 
inferred; 
T2. It is experimental—deduced from empirical 
evidence; and 
T3. It is concerned with the observable, 
measurable properties of an entity or 
process, rather than its nature. 
A proposition is a ‘hypothesis’ iff it meets one 
or more of the following conditions: 
H1. It is, at best, only highly probable; or 
H2. It is a conjecture or speculation—
something not based on empirical 
evidence; or 
H3. It is concerned with the nature of an 
entity or process, rather than its 
observable, measurable properties. 
Table 1 Definitions of ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’8 
At this point, one might be tempted to conclude that Newton was advocating a 
wholesale rejection of hypotheses, especially considering his own rhetoric. However, we 
shall now see that, while Newton decried hypotheses—determined to preserve the 
certainty of his propositions and to avoid epistemic loss by keeping speculative 
conjectures apart—hypotheses played an important role in his negotiations between 
experimental results and certainly true conclusions. As Shapiro puts it: 
While it is true that Newton believed in a corpuscular theory, utilized it in developing many of his 
optical experiments and theories, and argued vigorously against the wave theory of light, he never 
believed that it was a demonstrated scientific truth (Shapiro, 2002: 227). 
                                                 
8 Note, firstly, that the conditions doing most of the work are T1 and H1. These are strong epistemic 
requirements. T2 and T3 might be considered corollaries of T1, but I have stated them here as separate 
conditions, because I think it is useful for the discussion: on Newton’s view, his new theory meets T2 and 
T3. Secondly, the definition of ‘hypothesis’ is disjunctive. Any one criterion on its own is a sufficient 
condition for calling something a hypothesis. This does not preclude the possibility of a hypothesis 
meeting more than one criterion—it is possible for a hypothesis to meet all three. Thirdly, a proposition 
meets the definition of ‘hypothesis’ if it fails to meet one criterion for ‘theory’. So, in a very broad sense, 
propositions may be divided into theories and hypotheses. 
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2.2 The roles of hypotheses 
So, Newton did not reject hypotheses wholesale—although he denied them an explicit 
evidential role. What, then, did they do? In this section, I identify two explicit roles for 
hypotheses in Newton’s methodology—explicating theories and suggesting experiments. 
Newton explained the role of hypotheses in a letter to Ignace-Gaston Pardies. It is 
worth quoting this passage in extenso: 
In answer to this it is to be observed that that Doctrine which I have explicated about Refraction 
and Colours consists only in certain Properties of Light, without regarding Hypotheses through which 
those Properties need to be explicated. For it seems that the best and safest method of 
philosophising is, first that we inquire carefully into the Properties of things and establish them 
through experiment; then more slowly that we seek Hypotheses for the explication of them. For 
Hypotheses ought to be brought forward only to explicate the properties of things, and not to be 
(unlawfully) assumed in determining them, unless insofar as they may provide experiments. And if 
anyone may conjecture, from the basis of the possibility of the Hypothesis, about the truth of 
things, I see not how anyone can determine certainty in any science; since numerous other 
Hypotheses always can be invented, which will seem to overcome new difficulties. And for this 
reason, I place aside improper arguments from the contemplation of Hypotheses, this avoidance 
having been thought necessary, and the force of the Objection to be abstracted, so that a fuller and 
more general answer may be received (10 June 1672, Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 164—my 
translation). 
In this passage, Newton tells us what hypotheses can and can’t do. Let’s start with what 
they can’t do. Hypotheses can neither constrain theorising nor influence our epistemic 
attitudes to theories. For example, explanations of optical phenomena should be drawn 
from the phenomena themselves, rather than from assumptions about, say, the purity or 
wave-like nature of white light. Nor should we take those assumptions into account 
when deciding whether or not to accept a theory. Instead, we must consider whether the 
theory is supported by empirical evidence.9 
                                                 
9 Nowadays, we might think that hypotheses (in Newton’s sense of the term) garner independent 
support from background theory, which enables them to have direct epistemic impact on theory. It is 
interesting to note that Newton doesn’t seem to have an explicit notion of an empirically supported 
background theory. However, one might argue that something like this underwrites Newton’s matter 
theory, expressed in propositions 1-10 of the Opticks Book 2. But this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Four decades later, Newton described a similar idea in a draft letter to Roger Cotes, 
again, quoting in extenso: 
One may suppose that bodies may by an unknown power be perpetually accelerated and so reject 
the first law of motion. One may suppose that God can create a penetrable body and so reject the 
impenetrability of matter. But to admit of such hypotheses in opposition to rational propositions 
founded upon phenomena by induction is to destroy all arguments taken from phenomena by 
induction and all principles founded upon such arguments. And therefore as I regard not 
hypotheses in explaining the phenomena of nature, so I regard them not in opposition to 
arguments founded upon phenomena by induction or to principles settled upon such arguments. In 
arguing for any principle or proposition from phenomena by induction, hypotheses are not to be 
considered. The argument holds good till some phenomenon can be produced against it (March 
1713, Newton, 2014: 120). 
Now consider what hypotheses can do. Hypotheses can be introduced to explicate a 
theory—that is, to make it more intelligible.10  In this context, the hypothesis was to be 
introduced after the theory had been established, and judged as permissible by whether or 
not it agreed with the theory: that is, hypotheses are merely possible states of affairs, 
where ‘possibility’ is set by coherence with our theories. Indeed, Newton claimed that it 
is a trivial business (“levissimi negtij est” (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 167)) to 
accommodate hypotheses to his doctrine (“accommodare Hypotheses ad hanc Doctrinam” 
(Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 167)). After all, he pointed out, Descartes’ and Hooke’s 
hypotheses of light might easily be altered to accommodate his theory.11 
Newton publicised his 1675 paper, ‘An Hypothesis explaining the Properties of 
Light discoursed of in my severall Papers’, for this explicit purpose. He explained: 
I have observed the heads of some great virtuoso’s to run much upon Hypotheses, as if my 
discourses wanted an Hypothesis to explain them by, & found that some when I could not make 
them take my meaning, when I spake of the nature of light & colours abstractedly, have readily 
                                                 
10 For Newton, introducing hypotheses in this context was an ‘optional extra’. But for others, it was a 
crucial step in providing an adequate explanation. Christiaan Huygens, for example, objected that 
Newton’s optical theory was incomplete without a hypothesis. For, without a mechanical explanation of the 
nature of light and colours, Newton had not taught us about the nature and difference of colours, but only 
the accident of their different refrangibility (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 256). 
11 For a discussion of Newton’s demonstration of this claim, see (Shapiro, 2002). 
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apprehended it when I illustrated my Discourse by an Hypothesis […] (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 
363) 
He puts a pedagogical spin on all of this: the purpose of writing up his hypothesis is to 
help others to understand his new theory. But presumably he thought understanding might 
lead to acceptance.12  And so the hypothesis seems to offer a ‘possibility proof’ for 
Newton’s theory. Nevertheless, Newton takes an explicitly instrumental attitude to the 
hypothesis: 
[…] not concerning my self whether it shall be thought probable or improbable so it do but render 
the papers I send you, and others sent formerly, more intelligible (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 361). 
Given the purpose for which the hypothesis is introduced, its truth or otherwise is 
irrelevant. A false hypothesis could perform the task just as well. Indeed, for Newton, 
when a hypothesis agrees with the theory and fits the facts, it is by no means confirmed. 
Hypotheses should fit the known facts, but their ability to accommodate the empirical 
evidence does not give them any credence—they tend to be underdetermined by the 
evidence. In contrast, propositions explaining observable, measurable properties can be 
certain, and therefore labelled theories, if they are obtained in the correct manner. 
Hypotheses can also play a role in the process of investigation: they may suggest 
experiments (“experimenta subministrare possint” (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 164)). Here 
one draws empirical consequences from the hypothesis—a process that Newton calls 
‘abstraction’ (“abstrahendam” (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 164))—and uses these to make 
predictions which can be tested. Newton used hypotheses in this way in his response to 
Robert Hooke. He presented these empirical consequences in the form of queries:  
I shall now in the last place proceed to abstract the difficulties involved in Mr Hooks discourse, & 
without having regard to any Hypothesis consider them in general termes. And they may be 
reduced to these three Queries. Whether the unequal refractions made without respect to any 
inequality of incidence, be caused by the different refrangibility of several rays, or by the splitting 
breaking or dissipating the same ray into diverging parts; Whether there be more then two sorts of 
                                                 
12 Indeed, Newton’s notion of certainty might be interpreted as ‘compelled assent’: Newton appeared 
to think that the evidence compelled him undeniably to his conclusion; no rational person, having carried 
out the experiment, could deny the conclusion (Walsh, 2017). And so, on Newton’s view, the only thing 
standing in the way of universal acceptance of this theory was lack of understanding. 
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colours; & whether whitenesse be a mixture of all colours (11 June 1672, Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 
1, 177-178). 
Cunningly, Newton used Hooke’s hypothesis to identify key points of empirical 
disagreement and then, in effect, to generate a series of crucial tests to decide between 
his account and Hooke’s.13  That is, Newton employed Hooke’s hypothesis to provide a 
kind of temporary platform: it served to make explicit empirical tests which could 
adjudicate between various ways in which the world might be. Let’s consider just the first 
of these three queries. 
The first query concerns the source of the phenomenon of elongation that Newton 
identified in his 1672 ‘New Theory’. According to Newton, his account and Hooke’s 
gave different reasons for this elongation: on his account, the incident light was 
composed of a mixture of rays of different refrangibility;14 on Hooke’s, the homogenous 
incident light was split into multiple parts. How can we choose between these two 
possibilities? Newton argued that they make different predictions about what will happen 
when the elongated image is projected through a second prism. On Newton’s 
refrangibility account, the rays only separate once—when they pass through the first 
prism (leaving the now homogenous, non-white rays). And so, the image remains the 
same size after it is projected through the second prism. In contrast, on Hooke’s splitting 
account, the ray should split every time it passes through a prism, and so the image 
should become more spread out with each subsequent prism. In a series of experiments, 
Newton demonstrated that there is no change to the size and shape of the image. In 
other words, his account generated the correct prediction; Hooke’s didn’t. And so 
Newton used Hooke’s hypothesis to identify a point of empirical disagreement between 
the two accounts, and then constructed an experiment that decided in his favour. Indeed, 
this experiment didn’t just rule out Hooke’s account, but all accounts that explained the 
                                                 
13 On Hooke’s account, light is a ‘pulse or motion’ through a uniform medium. White light is 
produced by ‘pure’ and ‘undisturbed’ pulses; colour is produced by the disturbance of white light. Only two 
colours are produced by the disturbance of white light; all the other colours are produced by mixing 
various amounts of those two colours with white light (summarised by Hooke in Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 
1, 112). 
14 Refrangibility is the degree to which light can refract when passing from one medium into another, or 
a “predisposition, which every particular Ray hath to suffer a particular degree of Refraction” (Newton, 
1959-1977: Vol. 1, 96). 
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elongation effect by appeal to breaking or splitting of incident light. Thus, ruling out 
most traditional accounts. 
And so Newton identified two permissible roles for hypotheses with respect to 
theories: (1) explicating the theory; and (2) suggesting experiments. An important feature 
of these supporting roles is that the epistemic status of the hypothesis is moot. This is 
not to say that there are no epistemic constraints on hypotheses. As we have seen, on 
Newton’s account, the admissibility of a hypothesis depends upon its coherence with a 
theory. But, for Newton, coherence is a very low bar: we should not be impressed just 
because a hypothesis ‘saves the phenomena’. Thus, Newton considered hypotheses to 
have little value in their own right. They were valuable only insofar as they could facilitate 
understanding, development and justification of theories. 
Moreover, hypotheses were only to be introduced in such a way that they would not 
directly influence the epistemic status of a theory. To put a modern spin on this point, 
hypotheses did not play any direct role in influencing our credence vis-à-vis a theory. 
Rather, a hypothesis could only support a theory in two ways: firstly, it could indirectly 
increase the conceivability or intelligibility of the theory, by demonstrating how it may be 
filled out metaphysically; and secondly, it could help to deliver an empirical result that 
could decide between two competing descriptions of the way the world is. It is important 
to note that, in the example we considered, Newton didn’t take the experimental results 
to provide additional support for his theory. That is, these results were old evidence: he’d 
already taken them into account in the development of the theory, and so they couldn’t 
provide further confirmation.15  Rather, the experimental result served to demonstrate 
that Hooke’s explanations did not ‘save the phenomena’. This process looks similar to 
the kind of scaffolding described by Currie (e.g. Currie, 2015, 2018). Currie describes 
cases where a coarse-grained hypothesis provides a platform from which to distinguish 
empirically between two finer-grained hypotheses.16  In the above case, Hooke’s 
hypothesis provides a platform from which to distinguish between his and Newton’s 
                                                 
15 Indeed, this ‘no double-counting’ requirement is a very common intuition: if evidence x has been 
used to construct a theory T(x), then x should not be used again in support of T(x) (for discussion, see e.g. 
Glymour, 1980). 
16 More generally, Currie argues that positing hypotheses can tell us what kinds of things will count as 
evidence, and hence, they can help us see the empirical ways forward (particularly in Currie, 2018). 
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accounts of light. Hooke claims that his hypothesis agrees with the observed facts—
indeed, his account can explain the phenomenon of elongation. Newton uses Hooke’s 
hypothesis to demonstrate that the two accounts are not empirically equivalent. In other 
words, he demonstrates that his account and Hooke’s have different empirical 
consequences, and constructs an experiment to decide between them. 
In the next section, we’ll consider how Newton’s hypothesis also provided a 
different kind of scaffolding. 
3 Investigating coloured rings 
In this section, I examine Newton’s use of hypotheses in his investigation of interference 
phenomena, now known as ‘Newton’s rings’. And, in doing so, I identify a third role for 
hypotheses in Newton’s methodology: scaffolding for the purpose of theory-building. 
Newton’s hypothesis on the nature of light postulated a physical cause for the observed 
pattern of coloured rings: an æthereal ‘pulse’. Operationalising the concept of a pulse—
i.e. defining the concept through the operations by which it was measured—gave 
Newton a unit of measurement and, eventually, a way of formalising and abstracting the 
explanation. Drawing on the architectural analogy, Newton’s hypothesis supported his 
investigation in a way that enabled him to build a theory. Once completed, the 
hypothesis was removed or ‘abstracted’. 
Before we continue, it’s worth outlining the key points of Newton’s hypothesis of 
the nature of light. The hypothesis, as he described it in his 1675 ‘Hypothesis’ paper, has 
three aspects. Firstly, there is an æthereal medium. This is a medium, like air, but rarer and 
more elastic. It fills empty spaces, including the pores of solid substances, and vibrates, 
carrying sounds, scents and light. The æthereal vibrations differ in size, causing different 
sensations. Secondly, there is light. Light is neither the æther, nor the vibrations in the 
æther, but a substance that is emitted from ‘lucid’ bodies and travels through the æther in 
the form of rays. Rays of light are physically heterogeneous, differing in size, shape and 
velocity, which accounts for their ability to cause different kinds of vibrations in the 
æther. Thirdly, light and æther interact. Light warms the æther and the æther presses on 
the light. This interaction is the cause of most optical phenomena. Newton made use of 
his hypothetical æthereal vibrations in order to establish the length of a ‘pulse’—the 
distance between æthereal contractions. 
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That this hypothesis played an important role in Newton’s establishing the 
phenomenon of periodicity and his formulation of the theory of fits is old news.17  Here, 
we are less interested in the details of the case itself than in what the case can teach us 
about Newton’s method of hypotheses. In fact, in this case, Newton’s hypothesis 
performs something of a ‘stealth function’—the role itself is not made explicit in 
Newton’s methodology, and moreover, the formal presentation of the theory in the 
Opticks belies the fact that hypotheses played such an important role.18  I shall argue that 
this role is consistent with Newton’s overarching method. His use of the hypothesis 
enabled him to make the calculations which, in turn, led him to formulate the theory of 
fits. Once formulated, Newton abstracted his formal account of periodicity of all 
hypothetical assumptions about the physical cause—the scaffold was removed. Despite 
the fact that Newton’s didn’t make this role explicit, this case offers a nice example of the 
role of hypotheses in Newton’s natural philosophy. 
3.1 Pulses and intervals 
Here’s an interesting feature of Newton’s hypothesising. Where conceiving of light as 
corpuscular clearly played an important heuristic function in Newton’s conception of 
light as heterogeneous,19 it was the concept of æthereal vibrations that was most useful 
for Newton’s work on interference phenomena—establishing the periodicity of light and 
the theory of fits. In this section, we see that Newton made use of his hypothetical 
æthereal vibrations in order to establish the length of a ‘pulse’—the distance between 
æthereal expansions and contractions. However, in the final version of the theory, 
presented in the Opticks Book 2, ‘pulses’ were replaced with ‘intervals’—a unit of 
measurement. 
                                                 
17 For the full gory details of the development of Newton’s theory of fits, see (Shapiro, 1993). 
18 Given Newton’s method of hypotheses, and the requirement that the final product be cleansed of 
all hypotheses, it should come as no surprise that we don’t find them playing an obvious role in his 
published work. Fortunately, Newton’s use of hypotheses in this case is well documented in unpublished 
draft material. 
19 We shall discuss this in section 4.1. 
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Newton began investigating interference phenomena in the mid-1660s—around the 
time he was investigating the elongation effect.20  In the Opticks, he would describe these 
investigations as “Observations concerning the Reflexions, Refractions, and Colours of thin 
transparent Bodies” (Newton, 1952: 193) (the ‘thin transparent body’, also described as a 
‘thin film’ or ‘thin plate’, refers to the film of air in the gap between the two glass 
surfaces).21  Newton had noticed that, when two glass prisms are pressed together, a 
transparent spot appears where the two surfaces touch, with concentric rings of light 
appearing around that spot. Newton supposed that the effect was generated by the 
alternate reflection and transmission of light incident upon the top prism. Where the two 
surfaces touched, the light seemed to be completely transmitted; where there was a gap, 
the light seemed to be sometimes reflected and sometimes transmitted. 
Newton wondered if this was a function of the thickness of the gap between the two 
glass surfaces. To establish this effect, he pressed a convex lens of a known curvature 
onto a flat glass plate—this produced a regular pattern of concentric circles and enabled 
him to (1) measure the size and colour of each ring and (2) calculate the thickness of the 
gap between the two surfaces (see figure 1). Newton noticed that the rings formed 
repeating patterns of colours, and established a numerical relationship between ring 
colour and thickness of the film. He was struck by the arithmetical regularity of the 
patterns of colours—the alternation was periodic, not random. 
                                                 
20 At this time, Newton was also developing a theory of vision which utilised the vibrating æther as 
the primary means by which colour sensations travel from the retina up the optic nerve to the brain (e.g. 
Hamou, 2014). 
21 Hooke had described this phenomenon first, in his Micrographia (1665), but the phenomenon is now 
known as ‘Newton’s rings’. 
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Figure 1 Investigating the colours of thin films: Newton’s basic experimental set-up.22 
Newton wanted to explain this phenomenon by drawing on his theory of light and 
colour: colour is an original and immutable property of individual rays of light and bodies 
have colour because they reflect coloured rays of light. But in order to see how this 
explanation might work, he turned to his hypothesis. He imagined light corpuscles 
alternately passing through and bouncing off the two surfaces. When light is transmitted 
through a prism, the rays separate into their colour groups. Similarly, when light is 
incident upon a thin film, the rays seem to separate according to their colours—each 
colour group forming its own set of rings. And yet, unlike the prism case, the colour 
pattern repeats itself indefinitely. 
So what caused this pattern? Newton quickly recognised that it couldn’t simply be 
attributed to unequal refrangibility. He started to think about the phenomenon as a 
property of the vibrations being stirred up by the light corpuscles—light, being physically 
heterogeneous, could stir up vibrations of different sizes. And so he postulated a ‘pulse’. 
A pulse is not an action or property of the light itself, but a feature of the æthereal 
vibrations. Æther is excited by the light striking it, and begins to vibrate, and hence, to 
expand and contract periodically. If a ray of light approaches a surface when the æther is 
contracted, it is reflected; but if the æther is expanded, then the ray is transmitted. ‘Pulse’ 
refers to the period or distance between expansion and contraction. And so, if light 
approached a surface after one pulse, it was reflected; if it approached the surface after 
                                                 
22 Where the thickness of the film (t) is a function of the radius of the sphere (r) and the diameter of 
the ring (d): t=d 2/8r. 
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two pulses, it was transmitted; if it approached a surface after three pulses, it was 
reflected; and so on… Each colour excited pulses of a different length. 
A pulse was not something that Newton could directly observe or measure—it being 
a property of an invisible and hypothetical medium. However, Newton took its existence 
to be indicated by the regularity of the phenomenon. And this was something Newton 
could measure. Knowing the curvature of the lens and the diameter of the rings, Newton 
could calculate the thickness of the film (i.e. the air) at any point (represented in figure 1). 
He knew that, when the two surfaces are touching, light is transmitted.23  So he took the 
smallest ring to represent the smallest gap required for light to be reflected. Establishing 
the thickness of the air at the innermost ring, he identified the length of ‘one pulse’. A 
pulse thus became a unit of measurement: light was reflected when the distance between 
the two glass surfaces was equal to 1, 3, 5, 7, etc. pulses, and transmitted at 2, 4, 6, 8, etc. 
pulses. And so Newton took a vague hypothetical concept—neither observable or 
measurable directly—and, attaching it to an empirical effect, clearly defined it. Æthereal 
pulses became measurable and understandable in terms of empirical observations. 
Early on, Newton made this concept explicit, describing the details in an early 
manuscript, ‘Of Colors’24 (c. 1665-6). He had already established the diameters of the 
rings and had noticed that the squares of the diameters of successive rings increased 
integrally. For the first six circles, he established that the thickness of the air increased in 
integral multiples of the thickness of the air at the first circle. He then calculated:25 
                                                 
23 According to Newton’s matter theory, if there is no gap between two mediums of the same density, 
the surfaces of the two mediums effectively disappear—the two mediums become one. See, for example, 
Newton’s discussion of proposition 1 in his Opticks Book 2 (Newton, 1952: 246-248). 
24 MS. Add. 3975, pp. 1-22. 
25 Shapiro has pointed out that these calculations (even the adjusted ones) were widely off the mark. 
However, they were enough to provide a measure for the periodicity. The method for determining the 
thickness of the film would later allow him to develop a mathematical theory of the periodicity (Shapiro, 
2002). 
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[…] the thicknesse of the aire <for one> circle26 was 1/64000 inch or 0,000015625. [which is the 
space of the pulse of the vibrating medium.] <by measuring it since more exactly I find 1/83000 = 
to the said thicknesse> (MS. Add. 3975, p. 10). 
Notice the bracketed remark. Newton wasn’t simply reporting on an observed regularity 
(the thickness of the film for a given ring). He was treating his notion of a hypothetical 
pulse as the physical cause of the regularity, and using his calculations of thickness to 
operationally define the notion. 
In his manuscript ‘Of the coloured circles twixt two contiguous glasses’27 (c. 1670), 
Newton went even further, establishing the ‘ratio of pulses’ for purple at one end of the 
spectrum to red at the other end: 
Prop 6  That if the glasse bee illuminated by coloured light, that which is most refrangible makes 
the least circles. & the thicknes of a pulse for the28 extreame red, to that for the extreame 
<purple>29 is <greater than 3 to 2>30 & scarce greater than 5 to 3. Viz about 9 to 14 or 13 to 20 
(MS. Add. 3970, f. 350r). 
This ratio provided an empirical foundation for Newton’s quantitative treatment of 
colours of solid bodies. 
Newton’s 1675 ‘Hypothesis’ offered a more extensive discussion of the mechanism 
by which the phenomenon of coloured rings is produced: 
If the plate be of such a thicknesse, that the condensed part of the first wave overtake the ray at the 
second Superficies, it must be reflected there; if double that thicknesse that the following rarefied 
part of the wave, that is, the space between that and the next wave, overtake it, there it must be 
transmitted; if triple the thicknesse that the condensed part of the second wave overtake it, there it 
must be reflected, & so where the Plate is 5. 7. or 9 times that thickness it must be reflected by 
reason of the third fourth or fift wave overtakeing it at the second Superficies; but when it is 4. 6. 
or 8. times that thicknesse, so that the ray may be overtaken there by the dilated interval of those 
                                                 
26 Following “{illeg.}” deleted. 
27 MS. Add. 3970, ff. 350r-353v. 
28 Following “{illeg.}” deleted. 
29 Following “blew” deleted. 
30 Following “twixt 4½ 3 to 5 to 3 or above” deleted. 
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waves, it shall be transmitted, & so on; the second Superficies being made able or unable to reflect 
accordingly as it is condensed or expanded by the waves (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 378). 
Interestingly, in this passage, Newton was no longer using the term ‘pulse’—talking 
instead about ‘dilated intervals’. The underlying mechanism looked the same: light of a 
given colour will be reflected when the length of the vibration, or some multiple of the 
length of the vibration, matches the thickness of the film, and transmitted otherwise. But 
the terminology was in flux. The trouble was, of course, that the concept of a pulse was 
unacceptably hypothesis-laden—at least, for Newton’s methodology. The challenge was 
to retain the important insights it yielded without the problematic metaphysical 
commitment. 
Vibrations were still crucial to Newton’s account when he started preparing the 
manuscript for the Opticks (early 1690s): 
Prop 9  The motion excited in31 <pellucid> bodies by32 <the impulses33 of> the incident rays of 
light is a vibrating one & the vibrations are propagated every way in concentric circles from34 the 
points of the incidence35 through36 the bodies (Add. MS. 3970, f337r). 
And: 
Prop. 737. The38 vibrations excited by the more refrangible rays are shorter then those excited by the 
less refrangible ones: <& upon this difference depends the different reflexibility & different 
inflexibility of light.> (MS. Add. 3970, f373r). 
                                                 
31 Following “by” deleted. 
32 Following “light is” deleted. 
33 Following “the incident” deleted. 
34 Following “through the bodies” deleted. 
35 Following “impu” deleted. 
36 Following {illeg.} deleted. 
37 Following “8” deleted. 
38 Following “Vision is made” deleted. 
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But in the published version of the Opticks (1704), Newton presented his theory of fits: 
austere and pristine, it was cleansed of all mention of æthereal pulses. Let’s now turn to 
this account. 
In Book 2 Part I of the Opticks, Newton explained the effect as follows: 
And from thence the origin of these Rings is manifest; namely, that the Air between the Glasses, 
according to its various thickness, is disposed in some places to reflect, and in others to transmit the 
Light of any one Colour […] and in the same place to reflect that of one Colour where it transmits 
that of another (Newton, 1952: 213-214). 
In other words, the pattern of coloured rings is produced by the alternating reflection 
and transmission of light of different colours. More experiments revealed that this 
alternating was periodic, increasing in an arithmetical progression, and moreover that this 
pattern continues “without end or limitation” (Newton, 1952: 279), and depends on both 
surfaces of the thin plate. 
In Part III of the book, Newton introduced a proposition to explain the 
phenomenon: 
Every Ray of Light in its passage through any refracting Surface is put into a certain transient Constitution or State, 
which in the progress of the Ray returns at equal Intervals, and disposes the Ray at every return to be easily 
transmitted through the next refracting Surface, and between the returns to be easily reflected by it (Newton, 1952: 
278). 
Abstracted of all mention of pulses, vibrations and æther, it is difficult to make sense of 
this proposition. Roughly, Newton was arguing that the observed periodicity of the light 
is a product of the interaction between rays of light and the two refractive surfaces. Just 
as light is differently refrangible, it also has some sort of disposition towards periodic 
reflection and refraction, under certain circumstances. 
Newton quickly set about making the proposition intelligible—indeed, on its own, 
the passage was nearly incomprehensible!  His approach here is very familiar to us: it’s 
the same approach taken in the 1675 ‘Hypothesis’ paper. Newton began with a 
disclaimer: it was not his purpose to inquire into the nature of the action or disposition 
(i.e. “Whether it consists in a circulating or a vibrating motion of the Ray, or of the 
Medium, or something else” (Newton, 1952: 280)). But, for the benefit of those who 
needed to be assured that some hypothesis could explain this disposition, he could offer 
one. In other words, he was offering a possibility proof. Newton started with an analogy: 
he directed his readers to consider how, when a stone falls into a pool of water, it creates 
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ripples. He then suggested that rays of light might cause the medium or substance of a 
refracting surface to vibrate in a similar way. This vibration, in turn, agitates the solid 
parts of the reflecting or refracting body, causing the body to grow warm or hot. The 
vibrations are propagated through the medium (like sound through air), and move faster 
than the rays, thus overtaking them. The vibrations have a pulse-like motion—causing 
the medium to alternately expand and contract. When the ray of light approaches a 
refracting surface as the medium is expanding, it will easily pass through the surface, and 
thus be transmitted through to the adjacent medium. However, if the ray approaches the 
surface as the medium is contracting, the ray cannot pass through. And so, instead of 
being transmitted, it is reflected. In short, Newton’s hypothesis was still roughly the 
same; it was simply no longer part of the formal explanation. 
True to his method of hypotheses, Newton was careful to maintain epistemic 
distance from this explanation. He wrote: 
But whether this Hypothesis be true or false I do not here consider. I content my self with the bare 
Discovery, that the Rays of Light are by some cause or other alternately disposed to be reflected or 
refracted for many vicissitudes (Newton, 1952: 280-281). 
In other words, this hypothesis was here merely to help with uptake and intelligibility—
its truth or otherwise was beside the point. Moreover, to emphasise this, and to abstract 
the theory from the hypothesis once more, Newton introduced a new definition: 
The returns of the disposition of any Ray to be reflected I will call its Fits of easy Reflexion, and those of its 
disposition to be transmitted its Fits of easy Transmission, and the space it passes between every return and the 
next return, the Interval of its Fits (Newton, 1952: 281). 
By introducing this definition, Newton was clearly trying to avoid hypothesis-loaded 
language to explain (what he saw as) a hypothesis-free physical concept. 
3.2 Scaffolding the theory of fits 
Æthereal vibrations played two roles with respect to Newton’s theory of fits. Firstly, as 
we have just seen, in the Opticks Newton introduced the hypothesis to explicate the 
formal theory—to offer a possibility proof. That is, the hypothesis was there to satisfy 
“[t]hose that are averse from assenting to any new Discoveries, but such as they can 
explain by an Hypothesis” (Newton, 1952: 280). Moreover, his attitude to æthereal 
vibrations was explicitly instrumental: “whether this Hypothesis be true or false I do not 
here consider” (Newton, 1952: 280-281). Secondly, from Newton’s unpublished 
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manuscripts, we saw that he used the hypothesis to posit a physical cause for the 
observed pattern of coloured rings: an æthereal ‘pulse’. He operationalised the concept, 
which provided him with a unit of measurement and, eventually, a way of formalising 
and abstracting the explanation. The latter usage was not explicitly identified by Newton 
as a permissible role for hypotheses in any of his methodological statements. And so we 
have identified a third role for hypotheses in Newton’s methodology: scaffolding for the 
purpose of theory-building. 
The two explicit roles for hypotheses in Newton’s methodology—explicating 
theories and suggesting experiments—look very different to this third role. For one 
thing, there is a sense in which, in the former roles, hypotheses function as heuristics: 
hypotheses enable individuals to discover or learn something for themselves. As Newton 
described them, hypotheses invite an individual to think about a problem, phenomenon 
or theory in a way that guides them towards a solution. But hypotheses are not perfect 
guides to truth. When they are employed to explicate a theory, the truth is already 
available—the hypothesis merely helps with understanding or uptake of the truth. When 
they are employed to suggest experiments, the truth is revealed experimentally—the 
hypothesis merely points the experimenter towards a certain set of experiments. In both 
cases, the truth lies somewhere other than with the hypothesis. In the case we’ve just 
examined, Newton’s hypothesis did not merely serve as a heuristic; rather it provided 
crucial, albeit temporary, support for the investigation. 
While this use of a hypothesis doesn’t fit with Newton’s explicit method of 
hypotheses, this role should be considered permissible on Newton’s account. In this role, 
the epistemic status of the hypothesis is not at issue, and so the role is consistent with 
Newton’s methodology. Recall that an important feature of the first two supporting roles 
is that the truth or otherwise of the hypothesis is irrelevant. Hypotheses were not 
introduced to be supported or believed; they were there to facilitate understanding, 
development and justification of theories. Furthermore, recall that hypotheses were only 
to be introduced in such a way that they would not directly influence the epistemic status 
of a theory. A hypothesis might support a theory indirectly by increasing the 
conceivability or intelligibility of the theory or by helping to deliver an empirical result 
that could decide between two competing accounts of the world. 
In the third role, the hypothesis guides the way Newton thinks about interference 
phenomena. It provides him with a concept that he can operationalise, which enables 
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him to gather more experimental results and eventually construct a theory. In other 
words, the hypothesis helps him to identify features of the phenomenon that he can 
measure and theorise about. But then he extracts the hypothesis, leaving the theory 
supported by experimental results.39  That is, the theory is ultimately supported 
empirically. Here it’s useful to distinguish between ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’. 
Newton’s hypothesis was involved in the discovery of his theory of fits, but not in its 
justification: its truth was irrelevant to the justification of the theory. 
When investigating interference phenomena, Newton’s use of æthereal vibrations 
enabled him to make the calculations which, in turn, led him to formulate the theory of 
fits. Once formulated, Newton abstracted his formal account of periodicity of all 
hypothetical assumptions about the physical cause. And so, in Newton’s methodology 
hypotheses can provide scaffolds for theorising: hypotheses were to be separated from 
the final presentation of the theory, but were a necessary means for building the theory. 
Hypotheses, then, had a purely instrumental role in Newton’s methodology: he could use 
hypotheses, without feigning them. 
One final point, before we turn to consider lessons from this case. The notion of 
scaffolding looks like a promising way to think of Newton’s use of hypotheses in other 
contexts. For example, scaffolding occurs when Newton began to investigate the 
phenomenon of coloured fringes—what’s now referred to as ‘diffraction’. Again, 
Newton did not get very far with the investigation before he turned to his hypothesis. 
This time, the process wasn’t completed and the scaffolding wasn’t removed. Instead, 
Newton used the scaffold to structure the investigation and develop a rough idea of how 
formal theory might look. This resembles the early stages of Newton’s investigation of 
interference phenomena, and so I take it that this fits with what I have identified as 
Newton’s third way of using hypotheses. Newton presented this work in the form of 
queries.40 
                                                 
39 Shapiro has argued that Newton’s theory of fits was actually well-supported by his experiments on 
thick plates (Shapiro, 1993: 201). In the Opticks, these were introduced after his theory of fits. 
40 We might also understand the hypotheses in the Principia as providing scaffolding. But this is 
beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
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4 Lessons from the case 
In this paper, I’ve examined Newton’s use of hypotheses in his investigations of 
interference phenomena and provided a three-pronged analysis of the roles of 
hypotheses in Newton’s work—the first two follow his own methodological statements, 
but I have identified a third role: scaffolding for the purpose of theory-building. It is now 
time to draw some lessons from this case. I’ll discuss, first, how we should understand 
Newton’s metaphysics, and second, early modern experimental philosophy more 
generally. 
4.1 Vibrations and corpuscles 
Newton’s hypothesis on the nature of light is usually described as a ‘corpuscular 
hypothesis’. However, we’ve seen that, at least in Newton’s investigation of more 
complex optical phenomena, æthereal vibrations did a lot of the work. This tells us 
something about how we should understand Newton’s hypothetical entities, posits, and 
processes. We should understand his corpuscular hypothesis functionally. As we shall 
see, this function varies according to context. In some contexts, a corpuscle is a thing 
that sustains qualities; in other contexts, a corpuscle is something that can excite 
vibrations in a medium. In short, in Newton’s hypothesis, to be a corpuscle is to play a 
certain kind of role.41 
Let’s consider how Newton argued for the corpuscular nature of light. In the final 
pages of his ‘New Theory’ (1672), Newton suggests that light is a substance, as opposed 
to a wave or a pressure. That is, light is a substantial body, rather than a quality of a body: 
For, since Colours are the qualities of Light, having its Rays for their intire and immediate subject, 
how can we think those Rays qualities also, unless one quality may be the subject of and sustain 
another; which in effect is to call it substance. We should not know Bodies for substances, were it not 
                                                 
41 I take it that my account complements Katherine Brading’s ‘law-constitutive approach’ (e.g. 
Brading, 2011, 2012). Brading argues that, in Newton’s mechanics and celestial dynamics, physical bodies 
are functionally defined—a necessary condition for the individuation and identity of physical bodies is that 
they satisfy the laws of motion. On her view, Newton’s avoidance of claims concerning the nature of 
bodies reflects not the estrangement of physics from metaphysics, but the entanglement of the two: 
Newton’s matter theory must be developed in consort with his mechanics, not prior to it. My account of 
Newton’s corpuscular hypothesis, I think, offers some support for Brading’s general picture, and yet 
complicates it in ways I have not yet fully explored. 
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for their sensible qualities, and the Principal of those being now found due to something else, we 
have as good reason to believe that to be a Substance also (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 100). 
Newton’s reasoning in this passage is revelatory. He offers two arguments for 
thinking of light as substantial or corpuscular. Firstly, he argues that, since colour is a 
quality or property of light, we should consider light to be a substance. But notice that 
this isn’t for any special empirical or metaphysical reason. It’s simply that we think of 
substance as the thing that sustains or supports properties—substance ties a group of 
properties together, it’s the thing that makes them properties of something. Since light has 
properties (specifically colour and refrangibility—and maybe others), and hence, is a 
thing that supports properties, it functions as a substance. Secondly, he points out that, since 
we don’t have direct epistemic access to substance, we recognise substance by its sensible 
qualities—such as colour. An important upshot of his theory of colour is that bodies 
have colour by virtue of reflected light. Thus, colour is not a property of bodies but a 
property of light. And so, Newton argues, since we recognise bodies as substance by 
virtue of properties such as their colour, now that we know that colour is not a property 
of bodies but of light, we should recognise light as a substance too. So again Newton 
hasn’t offered any special empirical or metaphysical reason to consider light a substance. 
It’s simply that it performs the substance-role with respect to colour properties. Which is 
to say, light is a ‘substance’ in that it supports colour. 
Another place where Newton argues for the corpuscular hypothesis is in his 1675 
‘Hypothesis’ paper. Here he argues for the corpuscularity of light (again, loosely defined) 
by virtue of its role in explaining optical phenomena. Having described the properties of 
æther and its vibrations, he writes: 
I suppose Light is neither this Æther nor its vibrating motion, but something of a different kind 
propagated from lucid bodies. They that will may suppose it an aggregate of various peripatetic 
qualities. Others may suppose it multitudes of unimaginable small & swift Corpuscles of various 
sizes, springing from shining bodies at great distances one after another, but yet without any 
sensible interval of time […]. But they that like not this, may suppose Light any other corporeal 
emanation or an Impulse or motion of any other Medium or æthereall Spirit diffused through the 
main body of Æther, or what else they can imagine for this purpose. […]  Onely whatever Light be, 
I would suppose it consists of Successive rayes differing from one another in contingent 
circumstances, as bignes, forme or vigour, like as the Sands on the Shore, the waves of the Sea, the 
faces of men, & all other naturall things of the same kind differ, it being almost impossible for any 
sort of things to be found without some contingent variety (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 370). 
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Again, this is revelatory. Newton is explaining the nature of light in terms of its function, 
and leaving the rest open to the imagination. Light might be corpuscular, an æthereal 
spirit, some other kind of force or process, or even a cluster of properties. But there are 
some constraints. Firstly, it needs to be physically heterogeneous, since Newton has 
established that white light is composed of a heterogenous mixture of rays. And so, if 
light is corpuscular, then the corpuscles need to come in a variety of shapes or sizes. Or 
if it’s some sort of wave or vibration, the waves need to come in a variety of sizes or 
speeds. Secondly, it must be something different to the æther and æthereal vibrations. 
Let’s look more closely at his reasons for this: 
I would suppose it divers from the vibrations of the æther, because (besides, that were it those 
vibrations, it ought alwayes to verge copiously in crooked lines into the dark or quiescent Medium, 
destroying all Shadowes, and to comply readily with any crooked pores or passages, as Sounds do,) 
I see not how any superfices, (as the side of a Glass Prism on which the rayes within are incident at 
an angle of above 40 degrees) can be totally opake. For the vibrations beating against the refracting 
confine of the rarer & denser æther must needs make that pliant Superficies undulate, & those 
undulations will Stir up & propagate vibrations on the other side (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 370). 
Again, he offers two reasons. Firstly, he reasons from an analogy with sound. He takes 
sound to be generated by waves or vibrations in air. For example, earlier in the paper, he 
had said: 
And, as in Air the Vibrations are some larger then others, but yet equally Swift (for in a ring of Bells 
the Sound of every tone is heard at two or three miles distance, in the Same Order that the bells are 
Stroke;) So I suppose the æthereall Vibrations differ in bigness but not in Swiftnesse (Newton, 
1959-1977: Vol. 1, 366). 
Comparing light to sound, he argues that sound travels in non-linear paths in a way that 
light cannot—indeed, there was no direct acoustic-equivalent of the shadow. And so, 
Newton argues that light can’t be a vibration. In other words, vibrations do not save the 
phenomena. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, if light is an æthereal vibration, 
then it ought always to be able to pass through bodies, because vibrations propagate 
across surfaces. But light is sometimes reflected; not just transmitted—we know this is 
the case because reflection is the cause of opacity. And so, again, Newton’s reasons for 
preferring one account of light over another are functional. 
We noted in section 2.1 that Newton’s hypotheses were constrained by the empirical 
evidence. The above offers a clear example of this process. Newton conducted 
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experiments to establish the (observable and measurable) properties of light, and then 
considered—often by analogy—what kinds of entities and processes might sustain those 
properties. He excluded some kinds of entities and processes on the grounds that they 
could not do the required work. So, for instance, light—the substance bearing colour 
properties—cannot be æthereal vibrations, because these cannot support the property of 
reflexibility. The basic idea, then, is that experimentally established properties allow us to 
rule out some possible entities and processes on the grounds that they would be unable to 
support—fulfil the function of supporting—those properties. It should be noted, 
however, that this process doesn’t allow us conclusively to rule in a particular entity or 
process. Hence, Newton’s vagueness vis-à-vis the precise nature of light. 
It’s worth considering why Newton settled on æthereal vibrations, and not 
corpuscles, to do the heavy lifting in the explanation of interference phenomena. The 
answer seems to be: because it made the problem tractable—it was a more successful 
way of thinking about the problem. From vibrations, Newton was able to establish the 
periodic nature of colours of the rings and to calculate a unit of measurement that 
enabled him to make predictions about interference phenomena. But he also considered 
whether corpuscles could do the job. For example, in his manuscript ‘Of the coloured 
circles’ (c. 1670), Newton was trying to understand rings in terms of corpuscles: 
Prop 2  That they42 swell by the obliquity of the eye. <soe> that43 the diameter of the same circle is 
as44 the secants of the rays obliquity; that is, reciprocally as that <part of the> motion of the ray in 
that said45 filme of aire which is perpendicular to it, or reciprocally as the force it strikes the 
refracting surface with all. 
Prop 3. And hence the spaces which the rays passe through twixt the circles in one position to the 
said spaces in another position are as the squares of the said secants or reciprocally as the quares of 
the sines, motion, or percussion (MS. Add. 3970, f. 350r). 
And so, using corpuscles, he tried to establish a relationship between the sizes of the 
rings and the obliquity of the incident light. However, he did not make much headway 
                                                 
42 i.e. the circles. 
43 Following “{illeg.}” deleted. 
44 Following “{illeg.}” deleted. 
45 Following “{illeg.}” deleted. 
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with this idea, for, as we saw in section 3.1, by the end of the manuscript, Newton had 
settled on vibrations and pulses as the crucial explanatory concepts. 
But he didn’t stop there. In his 1675 ‘Hypothesis’, Newton suggested that corpuscles 
might operate under the laws later described in his Principia:46 
Others may suppose it multitudes of unimaginable small & swift Corpuscles of various sizes, 
springing from shining bodies at great distances one after another, but yet without any sensible 
interval of time, & continually urged forward by a Principle of motion, which in the beginning 
accelerates them till the resistance of the Æthereall Medium equal the force of that principle, much 
after the manner that bodies let fall in water are accelerated till the resistance of the water equalls 
the force of gravity (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 370). 
And in at least one early draft of the Opticks, Newton toyed with the idea that the 
periodicity was a property of the velocity of corpuscles. For example: 
Prop. If the rays of light be bodies the <various bignesse> of the waves excited by them in 
refractions & reflexions arises from the various sizes & velocities of those bodies (MS. Add. 3970, f. 
342v). 
These speculations led Newton to wonder if some colours move more quickly than 
others. He hoped to integrate optics with mechanics and explain refraction using short-
range forces. On the account he offered in the Principia Book 1 section 14, different 
refrangibility was most easily explained by the differing velocity of rays of different 
colours (Newton, 1999: 622). Newton realised he could test this by observing the colours 
of the eclipses of Jupiter’s moons: when a moon disappears behind Jupiter, as it 
disappears, the slowest colour should be seen last; and as it reappears, the fastest colour 
should be seen first. Newton wrote to ask John Flamsteed, Astronomer Royal, if he had 
ever observed such a thing: 
When you observe the eclipses of Jupiter’s satellits I should be glad to know if in long Telescopes 
the light of the Satellit immediately before it disappeares incline either to red or blew, or become 
more ruddy or more pale then before (10 August 1691, Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 3, 164). 
                                                 
46 In the Principia, Newton developed this idea in the final section of Book 1, which concerned “The 
motion of minimally small bodies that are acted on by centripetal forces tending toward each of the individual parts of some 
great body” (Newton, 1999: 622). 
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Flamsteed replied that he hadn’t: “I cannot say that I ever saw any change to a blewish 
colour or red by duskish when I used a glass of 27 foot” (24 February 1692, Newton, 
1959-1977: Vol. 3, 202). And so Newton realised that this wasn’t a viable way of thinking 
about light. 
The differing velocity of rays couldn’t save the phenomena. Nevertheless, the 
contemplation of this hypothesis looks fruitful. From the hypothesis, Newton extracted 
some empirical consequences which he was then able to investigate. Flamsteed’s 
observations of the moons of Jupiter effectively provided a crucial test of the hypothesis. 
This process looks very similar to Newton’s use of queries to reject Hooke’s hypothesis 
(discussed in section 2.2). And so, this case looks like an example of our first kind of 
scaffolding: using hypotheses to suggest experiments. (Unfortunately for Newton, 
however, in this case the crucial observations didn’t decide in his favour.) 
Newton repeatedly said that he was unwilling to speculate on the nature of light 
beyond what could be inferred from its experimentally-established properties. We’ve 
seen that this prevented him from explicitly and unequivocally declaring his 
corpuscularism. However, his corpuscularian assumptions seemed to influence his 
theoretical claims. For example, he argued that original colours remain separate and 
unaltered when they are mixed to form white light.47  He was thinking of rays as one 
might think of grains of sand or powder—or, more likely, chemicals: the particles mix 
together, but each retains its separate identity.48  This influence was carried through to his 
study of interference phenomena and the theory of fits. As Shapiro puts it: 
[H]is theory of fits was still permeated by the emission theory of light in a latent form. The location 
of the physical activity of the fits at the second surface, the variation of the interval with direction 
of propagation, and the consideration of rays rather than wave fronts are features indelibly wedded 
to the emission theory (Shapiro, 1993: 201). 
And so, despite his claims to the contrary, Newton’s corpuscular hypothesis does 
constrain his theorising: it prevents him from considering other possibilities. For 
example, on Newton’s account, the relevant refractive surfaces were the innermost 
                                                 
47 Sabra has pointed out that this was barely intelligible to wave theorists (Sabra, 1967: 280-282). 
48 William Newman has recently demonstrated that Newton’s thinking about light in this way most 
likely originates with his alchemical investigations (Newman, 2016). We shall discuss the relevance of this 
in the final section. 
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ones—those immediately adjacent to the film of air—and the reflective and refractive 
activity occurs as rays approach those surfaces. On the present-day view, in contrast, 
some of the activity occurs at the outer surfaces. This is a possibility that Newton 
couldn’t even consider with his hypothesis involving corpuscles and vibrations. Again, 
this situation seems to have a scaffolding analogue: the size and shape of a building is, to 
some extent, constrained by the form of the scaffolding; similarly, Newton’s theory of 
light was constrained, to some extent, by metaphysical possibility.49  And so, although 
Newton wasn’t committed epistemically to the corpuscular hypothesis, he did seem to be 
committed to reasoning with it—and this may have prevented him from identifying the 
correct location of the optical activity. 
So, there is a lesson here for philosophers and historians who want to understand 
Newton’s metaphysical theses. They are not, perhaps, as concrete as they first appear. 
Rather, Newton’s hypotheses about the natures of things were based upon the capacity 
of certain kinds of entities and processes to support properties he had experimentally 
established. Unless the hypothesis was being used as a possibility proof, or a scaffold, he 
was not interested in developing it further. 
4.2 Corpuscular, Mechanical and Experimental Philosophy 
It’s now time to consider the broader picture: what does this case teach us about the 
relationship between corpuscularism, mechanism and early modern experimental 
philosophy? Well, as this volume attests, the three philosophies are related in complicated 
ways. Yet historical scholars often tend towards (over-)simplification by focussing on one 
philosophy to the exclusion of the others,50 or running them together. For example, Alan 
Shapiro argues that, for the Royal Society, the terms ‘experimental philosophy’ and 
‘mechanical philosophy’ were largely synonymous (Shapiro, 2004) and Daniel Garber 
seems to conflate mechanism with corpuscularism when he talks of the “mechanical (or 
                                                 
49 One might speculate here that Newton was too quick to rule out a wave hypothesis—perhaps 
betraying a lack of imagination of how light waves might move. 
50 There is, in principle, nothing wrong with such selective focus: historical scholarship necessarily 
involves foregrounding some things and backgrounding others (for discussion, see Currie & Walsh, 
Forthcoming). However, scholars have tended to foreground in such a way that the dominant narrative is 
one in which the mechanical philosophy is the main, or even the only, driving force of early modern 
philosophy (see, e.g. Anstey, 2015). 
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corpuscular) philosophy” (Garber, 2013: 3). Indeed, the early modern actors themselves 
often seem to speak of these philosophies interchangeably. For example, in his Excellency 
of Theology, Robert Boyle talks of “the corpuscularian or mechanical philosophy” (Boyle, 
1772: Vol. IV, 19), and in the preface to his Micrographia, Robert Hooke expounds the 
virtues of “the real, the mechanical, the experimental Philosophy” (Hooke, 1966/1665: 
Preface).51  Nevertheless, it’s worth attempting to draw the positions apart. 
Mechanical philosophy roughly states that natural phenomena should be explained 
by mechanical principles—i.e. matter and motion. Whereas corpuscular philosophy states 
that matter is composed of minute particles—i.e. corpuscles. Thus, the former is a theory 
of explanation; the latter, a theory of matter. For example, Anstey argues that, in the case 
of Boyle, the two titles bring out different aspects of his philosophy: 
[…] the ‘corpuscular philosophy’ connotes the role of particulate matter in the explanations of 
natural phenomena, whereas the ‘mechanical philosophy’ connotes the role of the twin principles of 
matter and motion (Anstey, 2000: 2). 
And so, as Boyle’s usage makes clear, there is a significant amount of overlap between 
the mechanical and corpuscular philosophies, for example the focus on shape, size, 
motion and texture; but they are not logically interchangeable. Indeed, it wasn’t the case 
that everyone who held a corpuscularian theory of matter was a mechanical 
philosopher.52  In contrast with the other two, experimental philosophy holds that our 
knowledge of natural phenomena is limited by the fact that we only have epistemic 
access to the natural world via the evidence of our senses. Thus, experimental philosophy 
is a theory of method, which can be viewed as placing epistemic constraints on 
philosophical endeavours—as opposed to the explanatory constraints of the mechanical 
philosophy, or the ontological constraints of the corpuscularian philosophy.53  So, at least 
notionally, these are three distinct philosophical positions. 
                                                 
51 For reasons discussed below, Anstey has argued that ‘corpuscular philosophy’ and ‘mechanical 
philosophy’ are only ‘virtual synonyms’ for Boyle—since there is a nuanced difference between them 
(Anstey, 2000: 2). I have made a similar point with respect to Hooke (Walsh, 2012a). 
52 Alchemists, for example. 
53 This is not to suggest that the methodological views of experimental philosophers were uniform: 
experimental philosophers indeed found much to agree on at a coarse grain, and yet there was still a lot of 
room for disagreement on the finer details. 
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Many self-identified experimental philosophers cleaved to the corpuscularian 
philosophy and/or the mechanical philosophy. But often for very different reasons. For 
example, Boyle pleaded for the ‘excellency of the mechanical hypothesis’ on the grounds 
that the natural world is composed of corpuscles which operate according to mechanical 
principles (e.g. Boyle, 1991/1674: 139). Robert Hooke expounded the virtues of the 
mechanical and experimental philosophies, not for reasons of ontological commitment 
but because an understanding of mathematics and mechanics “will most assist the Mind 
in making, examining, and ratiocinating from Experiments” (Hooke, 1705: 19). This is 
not a perfect method: Hooke recognised that many natural processes are “hid from our 
discerning, or discovering of them” (Hooke, 1705: 20). And yet, when it follows a good 
natural history, reasoning mechanically is the best method we have. Finally, John Locke 
expressed ambivalence about corpuscularism. While he considered the corpuscular 
hypothesis “as that which is thought to go farthest in an intelligible Explication of the 
Qualities of Bodies” (Locke, 1979: IV.iii.16), he didn’t think we had direct epistemic 
access to corporeal substances. Rather, our knowledge of substance comes from 
investigating their ‘qualities’ and ‘powers’. However, the corpuscular hypothesis can 
guide us in our investigations of those qualities and powers. And so, given the ‘weakness 
of human understanding’, this is the best we can do. 
Newton was also an experimental philosopher. This is more explicit in his later 
work. For instance, in the General Scholium to the Principia (1713), he described his work 
as ‘experimental philosophy’. But his early optical work looks relevantly experimentalist. 
For example, in a letter to Henry Oldenburg (1672), Newton explained that “the proper 
Method for inquiring after the properties of things is to deduce them from Experiments” 
(Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 209). Moreover, we have good reason to suppose that 
Newton was familiar with, and sympathetic to, the Baconian method of natural history—
the experimental method favoured by the early Royal Society—by the time he wrote his 
‘New Theory’ paper (1672) (e.g. Anstey, 2004, Jalobeanu, 2014). And so we might be 
tempted to treat Newton’s corpuscularism as a by-product of his experimentalism, 
influenced, as it was, by his interest in the early Royal Society. However, as we’ve seen, 
Newton’s corpuscular hypothesis doesn’t look at all like a standard corpuscular 
philosophy (to the extent that there is such a thing as a standard position). For one thing, 
he was talking about light, not all matter. And for another thing, as we’ve seen, his 
commitment to the corpuscular nature of light was weak. He was neither strongly 
metaphysically committed to corpuscles, nor do they play an indispensable role in his 
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explanations—as we saw, it was the vibrating medium which did most of the heavy 
lifting. And so, it doesn’t look as though Newton adopted corpuscular philosophy as part 
and parcel of his experimental philosophy. 
In fact, Newton’s corpuscularism vis-à-vis light appears to be a consequence of his 
thinking about optics in terms of analysis and synthesis—i.e. white light can be analysed 
or separated into its component colours, which can then be synthesised or reintegrated 
to re-form white light. William Newman argues that this way of thinking about optics 
most likely emerged from Newton’s alchemical investigations—and, in particular, his 
reading of Boyle’s chymical writings (e.g. Newman, 2010, 2016). In the early 1660s, Boyle 
demonstrated that naturally occurring compounds could be analysed (or separated) into 
their parts and then synthesised (or reassembled) to form the original compound. From 
such demonstrations, Boyle argued for the corpuscularian basis of mechanical 
philosophy. Newman argues that Newton’s use of analysis and synthesis in his optics 
appears to be a direct appropriation from chymistry. 
This case offers an example of, what I call, Newton’s ‘rhetorical style’. Newton took 
familiar terms and stretched them to fit his methodology. He did this with physical 
concepts such as ‘force’ and ‘mass’, and methodological concepts such as ‘query’, 
‘hypothesis’ and ‘principle’. Newman’s work reveals that Newton also borrowed 
concepts from chymistry and adapted them to his optical work—massaging them to fit 
his own needs. And so, we shouldn’t be surprised that Newton’s optical corpuscularism 
looks different to, say, Boyle’s more general corpuscular philosophy. For Boyle, the 
corpuscularian hypothesis was taken as true—and it formed the basis for the mechanical 
philosophy which constrained theorising. For Newton, corpuscles were hypotheses and 
thus, as we have seen, played an instrumental role in theorising. More generally, this case 
should alert us to the limitations of interpreting early modern philosophers in terms of 
their adherence to general philosophical positions. Often, understanding such 
idiosyncratic thinkers as Newton by assuming terminological, methodological and 
conceptual continuity with his contemporaries is misleading. This is not to say that 
focusing on general philosophical positions, such as the experimental, corpuscular and 
mechanical philosophies, can’t be fruitful. Rather, this suggests that we should be 
mindful of the fact that the corpuscular philosophy, for example, looks different 
depending on who is expounding it. 
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I’ll conclude by abstracting a little. I’ve argued that Newton’s hypotheses perform 
three roles in his experimental philosophy. Firstly, hypotheses illustrate or explicate 
abstract theories with the purpose of improving uptake or understanding of the theory. 
Secondly, hypotheses provide platforms from which to suggest experiments, thus 
empirically deciding between competing accounts. Thirdly, hypotheses suggest 
underlying physical causes that Newton operationalises and thus represents abstractly in 
his formal theories. We saw that the second and third roles are related in that they are 
both cases of scaffolding. In both cases, hypotheses provide a temporary platform from 
which further experimental work and/or theorising can be carried out. This explains how 
Newton could use hypotheses without feigning them—just as an architect might use 
scaffolds, but not have them as part of the completed building. I’ve identified two related 
upshots. Firstly, Newton’s metaphysical claims—his hypotheses—are functional, they are 
importantly ‘thin’. Secondly, Newton was an idiosyncratic thinker who didn’t quite follow 
the semantics and norms of his contemporaries. These two upshots are important for the 
historiographical understanding of Newton and the context within which he worked. 
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